Branislav Bošanský

Date: 15:00, Tuesday, May 10, 2016
Speaker: Branislav Bošanský
Venue: IST Austria

Day: Tuesday,

Time: 15:00

We study dynamic games with finite horizon. These games evolve in time and the players are able to observe and react to information during the course of the game. We assume the players have imperfect information and there can be stochastic events. The problem of finding optimal strategies is determined in many subclasses of finite dynamic games and for many game-theoretic solution concepts – including maxmin strategies or a Stackelberg equilibrium, where one player publicly commits to a strategy, to which the second player plays a best response. During the talk I will describe some of the algorithmic challenges when computing maxmin and Stackelberg strategies and our recent domain-independent algorithms that overcome these challenges.

Posted in RiSE Seminar