Designing auctions for multi-parameter domains

Date: Tuesday, October 25, 2011
Speaker: Angelina Vidali
Venue: TU Vienna
Notes:

This talk will be at 17:00 in Zemanek HS, Favoritenstrasse 9, 1040 Vienna

In this talk I will give an introduction and present some of my recentresults in to two of the most fundamental problems in algorithmic gametheory and mechanism design: the problem of designing truthfulauctions for selling multiple items and of scheduling unrelatedmachines to minimize the makespan.
In the problem of designing truthful auctions we want to auctionmultiple items together. There might also exist budget and demandconstraints. In the problem of scheduling unrelated machines we assumethat the machines behave like selfish players: they have to get paidin order to process the tasks, and would lie about their processingtimes if they could increase their utility in this way.

Posted in RiSE Seminar